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Abstract
We study a mechanism designers trade-o¤between the complexity level and optimality
level of a mechanism. While our techniques apply to a much larger class of mechanism
design problems, we restrict our presentation to Mussa and Rosen (1978) quality
di¤erentiation in which a monopolist restricts itself to o¤ering a menu with at most a
nite number n of varieties. We prove that (i) the marginal benet of adding one more
variety is diminishing in n; (ii) the loss due to the restriction on the number of varieties
is of order no more than 1=n2; (iii) the marginal benet of adding one more variety is
of order no more than 1=n3; and (iv) o¤ering only two varieties can make more than
two-third of the potential prot that can be made by the second best o¤ering. Roughly
speaking, our analysis predicts that the monopolist should very plausibly o¤er only a
small number of varieties in the menu.
Keywords: Quality di¤erentiation, Monopoly pricing, Simple mechanisms
JEL Classication Numbers: D42, D82, L15.
1 Introduction
Mechanism design theory has now become a classic and far-reaching branch in economics.
It has been used to derive, for example, optimal income taxation scheme (Mirrlees (1971)),
optimal nonlinear pricing scheme (Maskin and Riley (1984)), optimal quality di¤erentiation
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(Mussa and Rosen (1978)), among many others. While these theoretical solutions of optimal
mechanisms have been well known, in reality however people embrace much simpler mechanisms,
like, an income taxation scheme with several tax bands and several marginal tax rates, a
multipart tari¤ with a small number of "parts", and a quality-price scheme with only a few
quality-di¤erentiated varieties. How well can a suboptimal but simpler mechanism perform
relative to the fully optimal mechanism? If complicating the mechanism is costly, how should
the mechanism designer choose the optimal "complexity level" of the mechanism?
We will consider the framework of Mussa and Rosen (1978) monopolistic quality di¤erentiation.
In this framework, a monopolist is uninformed about its customerspreferences over quality
(or types), but it can produce and o¤er a spectrum of quality-di¤erentiated varieties to
separate di¤erent types of its customers. The optimal spectrum involves a continuum
of quality-di¤erentiated varieties, tailor-made for each consumer type. However, if the
monopolist desires, for practical concerns, to o¤er at most a nite number n of varieties
only, it would design a discrete o¤ering (i.e. a menu of a nite number of quality-price
choices), in order to maximize prot subject to the number of varieties n. There would then
be a "constrained prot" n for each n. Our main task is to characterize the properties
of the constrained prot sequence fng1n=0. We also consider the setting with a xed cost
of developing each variety, which endogenizes the number of varieties. Roughly speaking,
our analysis predicts that the monopolist should very plausibly o¤er only a small number of
varieties in the menu.1
Although we restrict attention to the monopolistic quality di¤erentiation problem to
make our presentation concrete, we emphasize that the techniques developed in this paper
can be applied to other mechanism design (or principal-agent) problems, where there is
one principal and one agent, and the agent has one-dimensional private information.2 The
number n should be thought of as a measure of complexity level of a mechanism, which
could be interpreted in di¤erent ways in di¤erent kinds of problems. For example, n could
be reinterpreted as the number of two-part tari¤s o¤ered by the seller to consumers in the
context of nonlinear pricing, or the number of possible messages that can be sent from the
agent to the principal in the principal-agent models with limited communication.
The "constrained program", i.e. seeking the optimal discrete o¤ering subject to the
number of varieties, has no explicit solution unless for special cases (in Subsection 3.2).
However, we are able to uncover a number of qualitative features of an optimal discrete
o¤ering and the constrained prot sequence fng1n=0. Firstly, it is not hard to show that
1This is also true for a social planners welfare maximization problem.
2For the optimal solution of this kind of problems, see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) Chapter 7, or
Guesnerie and La¤ont (1984).
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an optimal discrete o¤ering (given any n) must be a step function uctuated around the
optimal continuous o¤ering (or second best o¤ering); and n monotonically converges to the
fully optimal prot (or second best prot) 1 as n gets large.
If adding every extra variety in the o¤ered menu is costly, and if the marginal benet
of adding one more variety n+1  n is diminishing, then the monopolist should optimally
choose the number n of varieties that approximately equalizes the marginal benet and
marginal cost of adding one more variety. Our rst main result is that the marginal benet
n+1 n is really diminishing in n. To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst diminishing
marginal benet result in any similar context. Intuitively, as the number of varieties that have
already been o¤ered is larger, the space for improving prot by adding one more variety is less,
and hence the e¤ectiveness of the extra variety is less. However, this "diminishing marginal
benet" property is far from trivial, because adding one more variety would bring about an
optimal adjustment of all previously o¤ered varieties. Although n  n 1 must ultimately
diminish, it is rather surprising that the property holds for every n in general setup. This
diminishing marginal benet property is not only interesting on its own, but also crucial
to proving many others of our results. Moreover, the proof of diminishing marginal benet
property, which involves comparing di¤erent constrained prots and suboptimal prots in
graphs, is very original and also interesting on its own.
Our second main result is what we call "quadratic rate result", i.e. the "uncaptured
prot" 1   n is of order no more than 1=n2. The intuition is that the slope of virtual
surplus with respect to quality is at at the ideal second best quality. Hence, the loss from
deviating from the second best quality, due to discrete o¤ering, is of second or higher order,
but not of rst order. Restricting to a nite number n of varieties, although di¤erent types
of consumers have to be pooled and served with a single quality, the distance between the
quality serving a particular type and the second best quality for that type is approximately
proportional to 1=n. A Taylor expansion argument shows that the uncaptured prot is of
order no more than 1=n2. Moreover, this convergence rate can be attained by a simple o¤ering
rule, which only involves uniformly distributed set of (suboptimal) varieties. Furthermore,
the bound we provide for 1   n is tight.
Our third main result is what we call "cubic rate result", i.e. the marginal benet
of adding one more variety n+1   n is of order no more than 1=n3. As a matter of
mathematical fact, the aforementioned quadratic rate result alone does not imply the cubic
rate result.3 The latter is an implication of the quadratic rate result and the diminishing
marginal benet property. Intuitively, diminishing marginal benet property ensures that
the uncaptured prot 1   n would be captured by earlier extra varieties. Hence, the
3But the converse is true.
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convergence rate of the marginal benetn+1 n would be faster than that of the uncaptured
prot 1 n. As yet another implication of cubic rate result and the diminishing marginal
benet property, the existence of a moderate marginal cost k of developing extra varieties
(cost of complexity) can plausibly justify the optimal number of varieties (optimal complexity
level) to be quite small. More precisely, the optimal number of varieties is of order no more
than 1=k1=3.
Our fourth main result is what we call the "two-third result". It says that the monopolist
can earn more than two-third of the unconstrained prot by o¤ering only two varieties, i.e.
2 > 21=3.4 The literature has results of this kind derived in the context of procurement
and regulation, and matching (see below), but to the best of my knowledge, this is the rst
result of this kind in any nonlinear pricing-type context. Most, if not all, of this kind of
results in the literature need to assume specic functional forms. The same applies to ours.
For our two-third result to hold, we assume consumersutility is linear and production cost
is quadratic in quality (so called linear-quadratic model, an extensively studied one in the
literature), and the distribution of virtual types satises a regularity condition. Once again,
the diminishing marginal benet property plays a major role in the proof.
The most related paper in the literature is the concurrently written one by Bergemann,
Shen, Xu, and Yeh (2011). It proves the quadratic rate result in the context of nonlinear
pricing. However, its analysis, which applies the quantization theory, works only for the
linear-quadratic model. On the other hand, Wilson (1989) and Wilson (1993) also give
quadratic rate results in the contexts that are mathematically di¤erent than ours, namely
e¢ cient rationing of services and Ramsey pricing respectively. But none of them provides a
tight bound. They do not analyze marginal benet of complicating the mechanism (which is
crucial to the optimal choice of complexity level) and the performance of a simple mechanism
relative to that of the second best or rst best.
In the context of procurement contracting, Rogerson (2003) considers "Fixed Price Cost
Reimbursement (FPCR) menus", that is, two-itemmenus where one item is a cost-reimbursement
contract and the other item is a xed-price contract, of which the principal allows the agent to
pick one. He shows that, if the agents utility is quadratic and the agents type is distributed
uniformly, then "the optimal FPCR menu always captures at least three-quarters of the
gain that the optimal complex menu achieves". Chu and Sappington (2007) allow a more
general family of power distributions, and show that a menu of two options, namely, a
cost-reimbursement contract and a linear cost sharing contract, can always secure at least
73 percent of the gain. McAfee (2002) in the context of two-sided matching shows that, if
matching surplus takes multiplicative form in agentstypes and the distributions of types
4Of course, this, together with the diminishing marginal benet property, implies 1 > 1=3.
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satisfy some regularity conditions, a social planner can divide the agents of each side into
only two classes such that the resulting "coarse matching" achieves at least half of the social
gain achieved by the fully optimal matching. These results can be regarded as analogous to
our two-third result.
My companion paperWong (2012) considers nonlinear pricing and compares the maximum
prots of di¤erent forms of pricing schemes (namely bundling, incremental discounts, and
all-units discounts) with any common level of complexity. It is complementary to this paper
for it sheds some light on how to choose among di¤erent forms of simple mechanisms.
Miravete (2007) uses a large sample of independent cellular telephone markets to structurally
estimate a monopolistic nonlinear pricing model. His estimates suggests that "rms should
only o¤er few tari¤options if the product development costs of designing them are non-negligible."
His nding empirically supports our theoretical results, and ours provides rationale for his.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the environment and
provides the standard solution in the literature. Section 3 characterizes the optimal discrete
o¤ering and provides a preliminary analysis of the constrained prot conditional on the
number of varieties. Section 4 presents the main results on properties of the constrained
prot sequence. The proofs we do not provide in the text are in Appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 Environment
Consider the Mussa and Rosen (1978) monopolistic quality di¤erentiation environment.
A commodity can be produced by a monopolist in a spectrum of varieties. The hedonic
attributes of the varieties are characterized by a one-dimensional nonnegative quality index
q. The consumers have unit demand for the commodity, i.e. every consumer chooses to buy
either 0 or 1 unit. A consumer who decides to buy the commodity must pick one of o¤ered
varieties. The higher the quality index of a variety, the higher the willingness-to-pay of a
consumer is.
Consumers are heterogeneous in their types, which are indexed by t. The utility of a
type t consumer who buys a variety with quality q and pays the price p is represented as
tv (q) p. If the consumer does not buy a unit, her utility is zero. The function v : R+ ! R+
is twice continuously di¤erentiable with the properties
v (0) = 0; v0 (q) > 0; v00 (q)  0 8q  0: (1)
The distribution of t is characterized by a cumulative distribution function F (), whose
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support is a compact interval [t; t]. We assume that F () admits a positive density function
f() on the support. The type of every consumer is the consumers private information. The
monopolist only knows the prior distribution F ().
The unit cost of producing variety with quality q is denoted as c(q). The cost function
c : R+ ! R+ is twice continuously di¤erentiable with the properties
c(0) = 0; c0(q) > 0 8q > 0; c00(q) > 0 8q  0: (2)
We also assume
c0(0)
v0 (0)
< t < lim
q!1
c0 (q)
v0 (q)
(3)
to guarantee that the market is nontrivial and the optimal quality for each type is bounded.
Note that for each type t, the e¢ cient allocation of quality is either 0 if tv0 (0) < c0 (0), or
the q  0 that solves tv0 (q) = c0 (q) if tv0 (0)  c0 (0). (Notice that not consuming a unit can
be identied with consuming a variety with quality 0.)
2.2 Unconstrained solution
If the monopolist can costlessly establish as many varieties as it wants, the problem it faces
is the standard problem studied by Mussa and Rosen (1978). That is, the monopolist solves
max
q()0;p()
Z t
t
[p(t)  c(q(t))] dF (t) (4)
subject to
tv(q(t))  p(t)  0 8t 2 [t; t] (5)
tv(q(t))  p(t)  tv(q(t0))  p(t0) 8t; t0 2 [t; t]: (6)
The functions p(t) and q(t) specify the monopolists choice of price and quality for consumers
with type t. The objective function in (4) is the (per consumer) prot. The constraint (5)
is the individual rationality (IR) constraint, which exists because every consumer has the
outside option of buying nothing, paying nothing and getting the reservation utility zero.
The constraint (6) is the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint, which arises from the fact
that the consumerstypes are private information.
Since the problem above has no constraint on the number of varieties to be o¤ered
(as opposed to the problems in later sections), and hence the standard solution in general
involves a continuum of varieties, we call it the "unconstrained problem" or "unconstrained
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program", and the maximized value the "unconstrained prot", denoted as 1.
Adopting the standard technique of solving this kind of problem5, the unconstrained
program is reduced to
max
q()0
Z t
t
[J(t)v(q(t))  c(q(t))] dF (t) (7)
subject to the constraint that q(t) is nondecreasing in t, where J(t)  t   1 F (t)
f(t)
is the
"virtual type function". Assume that J() is strictly increasing, which is a standard regularity
condition in the literature. Then the monotonicity constraint of q () is not binding, and the
prot-maximizing quality q1(t) for type t is such that
J(t)v0(q1(t)) = c0(q1(t)) (8)
whenever type t is served, i.e. whenever J(t)v0(0)  c0(0). For notational convenience, let us
assume J(t)v0(0) < c0(0) from now on, which means that some very low types of consumers
will not be served.
Proposition 1 (Mussa and Rosen, 1978) The unconstrained prot 1 can be written
as:
1 =
Z t
t
max
q0
fJ(t)v(q)  c(q)g dF (t) =
Z t
t
[J(t)v(q1(t))  c(q1(t))] dF (t) (9)
where the optimal continuous o¤ering q1() is dened by q1(t) = 0 for t  t < t and by (8)
for t  t  t, where the lowest served type t is dened by J(t)v0(0) = c0(0).
3 The Constrained Program
Now consider the situation where the monopolist restricts itself to o¤er at most n varieties.
The IR, IC and nonnegativity constraints still remain. Therefore, the monopolist solves the
following "constrained problem" or "constrained program":
n = max
q()0
Z t
t
[J(t)v(q(t))  c(q(t))] dF (t) (10)
subject to the constraints that q(t) is nondecreasing in t, and
q() takes at most n values except zero. (11)
5See for example Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Chapter 7.
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It is nothing but the unconstrained program adding the constraint (11). We call n the
constrained prot and 1   n the uncaptured prot given the number n of varieties.
3.1 The optimal discrete o¤ering
Now we are ready to analyze the optimal discrete o¤ering in a constrained program, given
the number of varieties n. First, it is not hard to show, under our assumptions, that the
constrained program (10) has a solution, and the monotonicity constraint of q () is not
binding. Moreover, from the monotonicity of q () and the constraint (11), q() must be a
nondecreasing n-step function. Let qi (i = 1; : : : ; n) be the quality serving for the interval
[ti; ti+1] of types (with the convention that tn+1 = t), we can rewrite the constrained program
(10) as a 2n-dimensional problem:
max
q1;:::;qn2R+;
t1;:::;tn2[t;t]
nX
i=1
Z ti+1
ti
[J(t)v(qi)  c(qi)] dF (t): (12)
The rst-order necessary conditions of (12) with respect to (q1; : : : ; qn; t1; : : : ; tn) can be
written as two rst-order di¤erence equationsZ ti+1
ti
J(t)dF (t)  v0(qi) = c0(qi)  (F (ti+1)  F (ti)) 8i = 1; : : : ; n; (13)
J(ti)  (v(qi)  v(qi 1)) = c(qi)  c(qi 1) 8i = 1; : : : ; n; (14)
and two boundary conditions
q0 = 0; (15)
tn+1 = t: (16)
Therefore, the optimal discrete o¤ering (q1; : : : ; qn; t1; : : : ; tn) in a constrained program can
be characterized as the solution of a system of two di¤erence equations. This system does
not have closed-form solution except for special cases (see Subsection 3.2). Not surprisingly,
both the di¤erence equations (13) and (14) converge to the unconstrained optimal o¤ering
formula J(t)v0(q) = c0(q) as the consecutive tis and qis become closer and closer.
Proposition 2 There exists a solution (q1; : : : ; qn; t1; : : : ; tn) to the di¤erence equations (13)
and (14), coupled with the boundary conditions (15) and (16), such that
n =
nX
i=1
Z ti+1
ti
[J(t)v(qi)  c(qi)] dF (t): (17)
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Proof. First, in problem (10), the monotonicity constraint of q() is not binding. To
see this, let the monotonicity constraint of q () be ignored for the moment, and suppose
that some solution q () of this relaxed problem takes values q1; : : : ; qn except zero, with
0  q1      qn. Then, since q () maximizes the objective function in (10), it must satisfy:
for every t 2 [t; t], q (t) is some qi that maximizes the virtual surplus J (t) v(qi) c (qi) among
q1; : : : ; qn. Now since J(t) is increasing in t and v(q) is increasing in q, the virtual surplus
function J (t) v(q)  c (q) satises strict increasing di¤erences in (q; t), and hence q (t) must
be nondecreasing in t.6
Second, the equivalent version of the constrained program (12) has a solution, and hence
n is well-dened. To see this, notice that the objective function in (12) is continuous in
(q1; : : : ; qn; t1; : : : ; tn). Moreover, qn can be without loss restricted to be below some large
upper bound, because our assumption (3) implies that tv0(q) < c0 (q) for all large enough q.
Then the constraint set is compact, and from Weierstrass Theorem a maximizer exists.
Third, our previous analysis reveals that any solution to (12) satises (13), (14), (15)
and (16).
The solution q() of the original constrained program (10) characterized by the above
optimal discrete o¤ering (q1; : : : ; qn; t1; : : : ; tn) is denoted as qn(), which we also call optimal
discrete o¤ering. From condition (13), as long as ti < ti+1 (which must be the case from the
proof of Proposition 3(i) below), we must have
c0(q1(ti))
v0(q1(ti))
= J(ti) <
c0(qi)
v0(qi)
< J(ti+1) =
c0(q1(ti+1))
v0(q1(ti+1))
;
and hence
q1(ti) < qi < q1(ti+1):
The pattern of an optimal discrete o¤ering is sketched in Figure 1: the optimal discrete
o¤ering of a constrained program is a step-function approximation of the optimal continuous
o¤ering of the unconstrained program.7
Once the solution of (q1; : : : ; qn; t1; : : : ; tn) is characterized, the solution of (p1; : : : ; pn)
easily follows. Namely,
p1 = t1q1;
pi = pi 1 + ti(qi   qi 1) 8i = 2; : : : ; n:
The rst one is from the fact that a type t1 consumer will be indi¤erent between buying the
6See the monotone comparative statics results in Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
7Even if the virtual type function J is not monotone so that the monotonicity of q () might be binding,
(13)  (16) are still necessary conditions for the constrained program. Hence our analysis is still valid.
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q∞(t)
t
q
t* t1 t2 t3
q1
q2
q3
0 t t
q3(t)
Figure 1: Comparison between the optimal continuous o¤ering q1() and the optimal discrete
o¤ering q3() when the number of varieties is 3
variety with quality q1 or buying nothing. The second one is due to the fact that a type ti
consumer will be indi¤erent between buying the variety with quality qi or with quality qi 1.
3.2 A solvable class of examples
This subsection studies a class of environments which one may call "linear-quadratic-uniform"
cases. In these cases the optimal discrete o¤erings and the constrained prots can be
explicitly solved, revealing a number of features that we will generalize to our general setup.
In this subsection, assume that the distribution of consumerstypes is uniform on the
support [t; t], which implies that J(t) = 2t  t. Also assume that consumersutility is linear
in quality and the sellers unit cost of production is quadratic in quality, i.e.
v(q) = A0q; c(q) = A1q +
A2
2
q2 (18)
where A0 and A2 are positive constants and A1 is a nonnegative constant. Our assumptions
(3) and J(t)v0(0) < c0(0) reduce to (2t  t)A0 < A1 < tA0. The optimal continuous o¤ering
is q1(t) = ((2t  t)A0 A1)=A2 for t  t, where t = (tA0+A1)=2A0. Substituting into (9)
and simplifying, we have
1 =
(tA0   A1)3
12A0A2(t  t) : (19)
Since J() and c0() are linear and v0() = A0 is a constant, the rst-order di¤erence
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equations (13) and (14) become linear as follows:
J(ti+1)A0 + J(ti)A0
2
= c0(qi) 8i = 1; : : : ; n; (20)
J(ti)A0 =
c0(qi) + c0(qi 1)
2
8i = 1; : : : ; n: (21)
With the two boundary conditions (15) and (16), it is easy to see that the optimal discrete
o¤ering satises
J(ti)A0 = c
0(0) +
2i  1
2n+ 1
(tA0   c0(0)) ;
c0(qi) = c0(0) +
2i
2n+ 1
(tA0   c0(0)) ;
or equivalently,
qi =
2i
2n+ 1
 tA0   A1
A2
; (22)
ti =
A1
A0
+
n+ i
2n+ 1
 tA0   A1
A0
: (23)
Substituting into the n expression (17) and simplifying, we have
n =
4n(n+ 1)
(2n+ 1)2
 (tA0   A1)
3
12A0A2(t  t) =
4n(n+ 1)
(2n+ 1)2
1: (24)
Thus, n is monotonically increasing to 1 as n!1; and the uncaptured prot
1   n = 1
(2n+ 1)2
 (tA0   A1)
3
12A0A2(t  t) =
1
(2n+ 1)2
1 (25)
is of order 1=n2. The fraction of constrained prot out of the unconstrained prot n=1
is approximately 89%, 96% and 98% for n = 1; 2 and 3 respectively. The marginal benet
of adding one more variety
n+1   n = 8(n+ 1)
(2n+ 1)2(2n+ 3)2
1
is monotonically decreasing to 0, and is of order 1=n3. The associated percentage change
n+1   n
n
=
2
n(2n+ 3)2
is approximately 8%, 2% and 0.8% for n = 1; 2 and 3 respectively.8
8The 2009 version of this paper also contains numerical simulations for other examples. In each of these
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3.3 Visualizations of constrained and unconstrained prot
We come back to our general setup. In order to nicely visualize the constrained and
unconstrained prots and then prove our results, it is convenient to use a change of variable
x  J(t), because the integrand in the constrained and unconstrained prots is linear in
virtual type J(t). Dene
H(q; x)  x  v(q)  c(q); (26)
G(x)  F (J 1(x)); x  J(t) = c
0(0)
v0(0)
:
H(q; x) is the virtual surplus at quality q and virtual type x; G() is the distribution of
virtual types. Now the unconstrained prot can be written as
1 =
Z t
x
max
q0
H (q; x) dG(x) =
Z t
x
H
 
q1(J 1(x)); x

dG(x): (27)
Given n and the corresponding optimal discrete o¤ering (q1; : : : ; qn; t1; : : : ; tn), the constrained
prot can be written as
n =
nX
i=1
Z xi+1
xi
H (qi; x) dG(x); (28)
where xi  J(ti) for i = 1; : : : ; n, and xn+1  t.
Equation (14) can be written as
H(qi; xi) = H(qi 1; xi) 8i = 1;    ; n: (29)
Fixing any qi, the slope of H(qi; x) with respect to x is
@H(qi; x)
@x
= v(qi) > 0:
Now, we can nicely visualize 1 and n in a single diagram.9 First note that for any i, the
two curves H(qi; x) and H(qi 1; x) plotted against x must cross only once at x = xi, because
H12 > 0. When plotted against G(x), they must cross only once at G(x) = G(xi). Moreover,
the curve maxq0H(q; x) plotted against x or against G(x) is the upper envelope of all the
curves H(q; x) with various values of q. The ideas are shown by Figure 2, in which n = 3.
From (27), it is clear that 1 is the area below the bold curve maxq0H(q; x) in Figure 2.
examples 3=1 is more than 97% and (4  3) =3 is less than 1%. See Wong (2009).
9Analyzing the social planners problems or the perfect information monopolist problems (both
constrained and unconstrained) only amounts to replacing J (t) by t, or replacing G() by F (). All our
results can be easily adapted there.
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maxq ≥ 0H(q, x)
H(q1, x)
H(q2, x)
H(q3, x)
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H(q, x)
G(x)
G(x*) G(x2) G(x3)G(x1) 1
Figure 2: Visualizations of the unconstrained prot 1 and the constrained prot n
Moreover, (28) and (29) say that n is represented as the shaded area.
An important insight shed from Figure 2 is that each of the varieties o¤ered helps
capturing the unconstrained prot 1 in a rst-order sense, since the slope of H(q; x) with
respect to quality q is at at the ideal second best quality. The uncaptured prot is therefore
of second or higher order. We will use this idea and apply Taylors Theorem to show that
the uncaptured prot is of order no more than 1=n2 in Subsection 4.2.
4 Properties of the Constrained Prot Sequence
4.1 Basic properties and diminishing marginal benet
The sequence of constrained prot fng1n=0 has the following properties. (Notice that 0 is
also well dened: when n = 0, no variety can be o¤ered, so that q0(t) = 0 and 0 = 0. But
of course, the analyses in Subsections 3.1 and 3.3 are only for n  1.)
Proposition 3 (i) n > n 1 for every n = 1; 2; : : :; (ii) lim
n!1
n = 1, where 1 is
characterized in Proposition 1; and (iii) lim
n!1
(n   n 1) = 0.
Proof. Obviously, 1 > 0 = 0. So suppose n  2. An increase in n (i.e. more varieties
allowed) weakens constraint (11) of the constrained program, thus n  n 1 for every n.
Moreover, this inequality must be strict because the optimal discrete o¤ering in a n-variety
program must involve n di¤erent varieties. To see this, suppose q () takes only n  1 values
except zero in a n-variety program. Because the optimal continuous o¤ering q1 () (dened
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in Proposition 1) is strictly increasing, some q^ () function that takes n values except zero can
approximate q1 () better than q () does, i.e. jq1 (t)  q^ (t)j  jq1 (t)  q (t)j for all t 2 [t; t]
and jq1 (t)  q^ (t)j < jq1 (t)  q (t)j for all t in some open subset of [t; t]. Since the objective
functions integrand J (t) v(q)   c (q) is single-peaked in q with unique maximizer q1 (t),
we see that the n-variety o¤ering q^ () yields strictly higher prot than the (n  1)-variety
o¤ering q () does. It proves (i).
Now the sequence fng1n=0 is increasing and bounded from above by 1. Thus it has
a nite limit, and lim
n!1
n  1. To see the equality in (ii), notice that, as an increasing
function, q1 () can be arbitrarily well approximated by nondecreasing nite-step functions.
Finally, since any convergent sequence in Euclidean space is also a Cauchy sequence,
(n   n 1) converges to zero as n goes to innity. It proves (iii).
We also prove that the marginal constrained prot n   n 1 is strictly decreasing
in n. Intuitively, as the number of varieties that have already been o¤ered is larger, the
space for improving prot by adding an extra variety is smaller, and hence the e¤ectiveness
of the extra variety is less. However, this "diminishing marginal benet" property is far
from trivial, because adding one more variety would bring about an optimal adjustment
of all previously o¤ered varieties. Although n   n 1 must ultimately diminish, it is
rather surprising that the property holds for every n. This diminishing marginal benet
property is not only interesting on its own, but also crucial to our analysis of the rates of
convergence of this marginal benet and the monopoly choice of varieties, and our result on
2 in linear-quadratic model.
Theorem 1 (Diminishing marginal benet) The increments of fng1n=0 are decreasing,
i.e. n+1   n < n   n 1 for every n = 1; 2; : : :.
The proof of Theorem 1 is in Appendix. To understand the idea behind the proof, let us
sketch the proof for the rst two inequalities: 2   1 < 1   0 and 3   2 < 2   1.
The rst one is equivalent to 2 < 21. The left panel of Figure 3 visualizes 2. Let q1;2
and q2;2 be the two quality levels involved in the optimal discrete o¤ering when n = 2. Now
imagine two plans of the monopolist: the rst plan is to o¤er only one variety with quality
q1;2, while the second plan is to o¤er only one variety with quality q2;2. The total prot from
these two plans is visualized in the right panel of Figure 3, where a "2" in an area indicates
that that area should be counted twice because that area accounts for prots from both
plans, while a "1" in an area indicates that that area should be counted once because that
area accounts for prot from only one of the two plans. Now 21 must be greater than the
total prot from the two plans, and from Figure 3 it is obvious that the two plans make a
total prot greater than 2. It proves that 2 < 21.
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Figure 4: Visualization of 1 +3
The second inequality, which is equivalent to 1 + 3 < 22, is harder. The shaded
areas in the left and middle panels of Figure 4 visualize 1 and 3 respectively. The right
panel of Figure 4 visualizes the sum 1 + 3. In this right panel, 1 is the area below the
dashed curve, and 3 is the area below the bold solid curve. A "2" in an area indicates that
that area should be counted twice because that area occurs in both 1 and 3. Similarly,
a "1" in an area indicates that that area should be counted only once because that area
occurs in either 1 or 3, not both. Next I will show that 22 must be greater than the
area indicating 1 + 3. To do this, we only need to construct two (suboptimal) 2-variety
menus such that the sum of those two corresponding (suboptimal) 2-variety prots is larger
than 1+3. The following procedure will do. First, let the optimal quality involved when
n = 1 is q1;1 and the optimal qualities involved when n = 3 are q1;3, q2;3 and q3;3. Rank
all the qualities involved in the above two constrained programs. For the example shown in
Figure 4, this ranking is q1;3 < q2;3 < q1;1 < q3;3. Then, collect those with odd ranking in
15
Π1 + Π3
221
2
2
2
1
1 2
1
G(x)
H
A lower bound of 2Π2
<
11
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
H
G(x)
Figure 5: Comparing 1 +3 and 22
one menu and those with even ranking in another menu. For the current example, the two
menus are (q1;3; q1;1) and (q2;3; q3;3). Whereas 1+3 is visualized in the left panel of Figure
5, the sum of the two 2-variety prots is visualized in the right panel of Figure 5. It is now
easy to see that 1+3 < 22 because the two panels of Figure 5 are the same except that
a "1" in the left panel is replaced by a "2" in the right panel.
The above logic is valid in general, and it is the intuition behind the proof of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1 For every n = 1; 2; : : :,
n   n 1
n
 1
n
:
Proof. Theorem 1 implies that, for every n = 1; 2; : : :,
n = (n   n 1) + (n 1   n 2) +    (1   0)  n (n   n 1) :
4.2 Rate of convergence results
This subsection provides our rate of convergence results for uncaptured prot 1   n,
marginal prot n+1   n, and monopoly choice of the number of varieties.
Theorem 2 (Quadratic rate result) There exists a nite constantM0 <1, not depending
on n, such that for every n = 0; 1; 2; : : : ;
1   n  M0
(2n+ 1)2
: (30)
16
Thus, 1   n = O(1=n2). Moreover, if the distribution G() of virtual types, given by
G(J(t)) = F (t), admits a density g() over the support [J(t); t] that is bounded from above
by g, then a tight bound is given by
M0 =
M1g
6


t  c
0(0)
v0(0)
3
; (31)
where
M1  sup
q2[0;q(t)]
(
(v0(q))3
v0(q)c00(q)  c0(q)v00(q)
)
<1:
Thus, the uncaptured prot 1   n is of order no more than 1=n2. The results
for linear-quadratic-uniform model in Subsection 3.2 show that this convergence rate is
tight. The bound given by (30) and (31) is also tight. To see this, observe that under
the linear-quadratic-uniform model in Subsection 3.2, M1 is A20=A2 and g is 1=2(t   t), so
that the bound of 1  n given by Theorem 2 is exactly the same as the explicit solution
of 1   n given by (25).
The proof of Theorem 2 is in Appendix. The underlying reason of this quadratic rate
result has already been explained in Introduction and Subsection 3.3. The main point is
that the slope of the virtual surplus function J(t)v(q)  c(q) with respect to quality q is at
at its maximizer q1(t). A Taylor expansion argument shows that the uncaptured prot is of
order no more than 1=n2 as long as the virtual surplus function is smooth enough in q. The
smoothness condition we need is precisely the twice continuous di¤erentiability of the value
function v() and cost function c(), which is a standard one in the literature. Moreover, as
can be seen from the proof, this convergence rate of n can be attained by a simple o¤ering
rule, which only involves uniformly distributed set of (suboptimal) varieties.
Theorem 3 (Cubic rate result) For every n = 1; 2; : : : ;
n+1   n < 27
8n2 (2n+ 9)
M0;
whereM0 is a bound of (2n+ 1) (1   n), which exists from Theorem 2. Thus, n+1 n =
O(1=n3).
Proof. For any positive integers n; i with n  i  1, we have
1   i = (1   n+1) + (n+1   n) +   + (i+1   i) : (32)
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By Theorem 2, the left-hand side of (32) is bounded by
1   i  M0
(2i+ 1)2
:
The right-hand side of (32) is bounded by
(1   n+1) + (n+1   n) +   + (i+1   i) > (n  i+ 1) (n+1   n) ;
due to Theorem 1 and the fact that n+1 < 1. Combining the above results, we have
n+1   n < M0
(n  i+ 1)(2i+ 1)2 8i = 1; : : : ; n:
It remains to nd a tight lower bound for
max
i2f1;:::;ng
(n  i+ 1)(2i+ 1)2:
Since the unique maximizer of (n  i+1)(2i+1)2 on R+ is (4n+3)=6, let us dene i(n) as
the largest integer that does not exceed (4n+ 3)=6. Then
4n  3
6
< i(n)  4n+ 3
6
;
max
i2f1;:::;ng
(n  i+ 1)(2i+ 1)2  (n  i(n) + 1)(2i(n) + 1)2
>

n  4n  3
6
+ 1

2

4n  3
6

+ 1
2
=
8
27
n2 (2n+ 9) :
Therefore,
n+1   n < M0
maxi2f1;:::;ng(n  i+ 1)(2i+ 1)2 <
27
8n2 (2n+ 9)
M0:
Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 together tell us that the marginal constrained prot n n 1
monotonically converges to its limit zero at the cubic rate.
If there is a (per consumer) xed cost k > 0 of developing each variety, and the monopolist
can freely choose the number of varieties, then the optimal number of varieties n is the
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maximizer of the prot net of the cost for developing varieties. As the per person cost k
of developing a variety goes to zero, the optimal number of varieties n(k) certainly goes to
innity. But the following corollary of Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 tells us that n(k) goes to
innity at an extremely slow rate, in particular, it is of order no more than 1=k1=3.
Corollary 2 Let n(k) be an (usually unique) optimal number of varieties when the per
consumer cost of developing every variety is k > 0, i.e. n(k) maximizes n   nk over
n 2 f0; 1; 2; : : :g. Then, n(k) = O(1=k1=3) as k ! 0.
Proof. If k is too large, then n(k) = 0. Suppose k > 0 is not so large, such that n(k) > 0.
Since n+1   n is decreasing in n due to Theorem 1, n(k) is characterized by n(k)+1  
n(k)  k and n(k)   n(k) 1  k. It follows from Theorem 3 that
k1=3n(k)   n(k)   n(k) 11=3 n(k) = O(1):
4.3 Performance of 2-variety menus in linear-quadratic model
In this subsection we make more assumptions. First, consumersutility is linear in quality
and the sellers unit cost of production is quadratic in quality. That is, the functions v ()
and c () are specied as in (18). Second, the distribution G() of virtual types, given by
G(J(t))  F (t), has a positive density g() on the support [x; t], where x  J(t) =
c0(0)=v0(0). Third, the distribution G() satises the following regularity condition:
G(x) G(x)
g(x)
and   1 G(x)
g(x)
are nondecreasing in x on [x; t] .10
Consider a auxiliary problem with, rst, the types below t (where J(t)A0 = A1) are
thrown out, and second, all types above t has to be covered (i.e. the outside option of
buying nothing is not available). For any positive integer n or n =1, the maximum prot
is then11
^n = max
q()0
Z t
t
[J(t)v(q(t))  c(q(t))] dF (t)
= max
q()0
Z t
t

(J(t)A0   A1) q(t)  A2
2
(q(t))2

dF (t)
10Equivalently, it says F (t)f(t) J
0(t) and   1 F (t)f(t) J 0(t) are nondecreasing in t on [t; t].
11Unlike our original constrained program, the integrand in ^n evaluated at the optimal discrete o¤ering
is typically negative for very low types.
19
subject to
q() takes at most n values (not except zero).
Also dene ^0  0.
There are two remarks to make. First, ^n < n for any n 62 f0;1g, and ^1 = 1.
Second, it can be easily seen that all of our previous results for fng1n=0 also hold for f^ng1n=0.
In particular, the diminishing marginal benet result can be proved in exactly the same way.
(Of course, the bounds in our rate of convergence results need to be modied. For example,
the factor (2n+ 1)2 in Theorem 2 should be replaced by (2n)2.)
Lemma 1 Considering the auxiliary problem, the benet of going from o¤ering one variety
to two varieties accounts for at least half of the total benet of going all the way to the optimal
continuous o¤ering, i.e.
^2   ^1  1   ^2:
The proof of Lemma 1 is in Appendix, which uses the technique in McAfee (2002).
Basically, the proof considers a suboptimal 2-variety menu with one variety serving those
consumers with below-mean virtual types, and another variety serving those consumers with
above-mean virtual types. It can be shown that the sum of 1 and ^1, which have explicit
forms under linear-quadratic model, cannot be larger than two times of the prot attained
by the above suboptimal 2-variety menu.
Lemma 1, together with diminishing marginal benet, implies that o¤ering only two
varieties can capture more than two-third of the unconstrained maximum prot.
Theorem 4 (Two-third result)
2 > ^2 >
2
3
1:
Proof. As noted before, f^ng1n=0 has the diminishing marginal benet property. In particular,
^2 < 2^1. It, together with Lemma 1, implies
1 =

1   ^2

+

^2   ^1

+ ^1
 2

^2   ^1

+ ^1 < 3^1:
Thus, ^1 > 1=3, and hence
1   ^2  ^2   ^1 < ^2   1=3
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2^2 > 41=3:
Appendix
In order to prove Theorem 1, we rstly introduce a simple lemma.
Lemma 2 Let S1 and S2 be two vectors of real numbers. (Their dimensions could be
di¤erent.) Then
max(2)(S1; S2)  minfmax(S1);max(S2)g;
where max(2)(S) denotes the second largest element in S.
Proof. If max(S1; S2) is in S1, then max(2)(S1; S2)  max(S2). If max(S1; S2) is in S2, then
max(2)(S1; S2)  max(S1). In both cases, our claim is true.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let the optimal discrete o¤ering given any number n of varieties
be (q1;n; : : : ; qn;n; t1;n; : : : ; tn;n), and let xi;n  J(ti;n). Notice that, for all i;m 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng
and all x 2 [xi;n; xi+1;n], we have H(qi;n; x)  H(qm;n; x) (see Figure 2). Therefore, it follows
from (28) that, for any n,
n =
Z t
x
max (0; H(q1;n; x); H(q2;n; x); : : : ; H(qn;n; x)) dG(x):
Now, for every x and n dene the vector Sn(x) as
Sn(x)  (0; H(q1;n; x); H(q2;n; x); : : : ; H(qn;n; x)) :
Then
n 1 =
Z t
x
max(Sn 1(x))dG(x):
Similarly,
n+1 =
Z t
x
max(Sn+1(x))dG(x):
Now, let us construct two suboptimal n-variety menus in the following way. First order
the 2n numbers q1;n 1; q2;n 1; : : : ; qn 1;n 1; q1;n+1; q2;n+1; : : : ; qn+1;n+1 ascendingly and denote
the ordered numbers as q(1); q(2); : : : ; q(2n), with the convention that q(i) is the i-th smallest
number. Let us also dene q(0) as 0.
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Construct the rst menu to include q(1); q(3); q(5); : : : ; q(2n 1) and the second menu to
include q(2); q(4); q(6); : : : ; q(2n). And the corresponding xis are constructed optimally given
the quality o¤ers, so that the corresponding prots ^oddn and ^
even
n for these two menus are
^oddn =
Z t
x
max
 
0; H(q(1); x); H(q(3); x); : : : ; H(q(2n 1); x)

dG(x);
^evenn =
Z t
x
max
 
0; H(q(2); x); H(q(4); x); : : : ; H(q(2n); x)

dG(x):
Notice that for any x, if
max
 
0; 0; H(q(1); x); H(q(2); x); H(q(3); x); : : : ; H(q(2n); x)

is H(q(i); x), then the corresponding second largest element
max(2)
 
0; 0; H(q(1); x); H(q(2); x); H(q(3); x); : : : ; H(q(2n); x)

must be either H(q(i 1); x) or H(q(i+1); x) from that fact that H(q; x) satises increasing
di¤erences (see Figure 2). Therefore,
^oddn + ^
even
n =
Z t
x

max
 
0; 0; H(q(1); x); H(q(2); x); H(q(3); x); : : : ; H(q(2n); x)

+max(2)
 
0; 0; H(q(1); x); H(q(2); x); H(q(3); x); : : : ; H(q(2n); x)

dG(x)
=
Z t
x
max(Sn 1(x); Sn+1(x))dG(x) +
Z t
x
max(2)(Sn 1(x); Sn+1(x))dG(x):
On the other hand,
n 1 +n+1 =
Z t
x
[max(Sn 1(x)) + max(Sn+1(x))]dG(x)
=
Z t
x
[maxfmax(Sn 1(x));max(Sn+1(x))g
+minfmax(Sn 1(x));max(Sn+1(x))g]dG(x)
=
Z t
x
[max(Sn 1(x); Sn+1(x)) + minfmax(Sn 1(x));max(Sn+1(x))g]dG(x):
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Therefore, 
^oddn + ^
even
n

  (n 1 +n+1)
=
Z t
x
[max(2)(Sn 1(x); Sn+1(x)) minfmax(Sn 1(x));max(Sn+1(x))g]dG(x)
 0:
The last inequality is from Lemma 2.
Now, we have
2n   (n 1 +n+1) 

^oddn + ^
even
n

  (n 1 +n+1)  0; (33)
which implies n   n 1  n+1   n.
It remains to show that the two inequalities in (33) cannot be both equality. The second
inequality in (33) is strict unless
max(2)(Sn 1(x); Sn+1(x)) = minfmax(Sn 1(x));max(Sn+1(x))g for almost all x:
By the denitions of Sn 1(x) and Sn+1(x) and noticing that Sn+1(x) has two more elements
than Sn 1(x), the above cannot hold unless
q1;n 1 = q2;n+1
q2;n 1 = q3;n+1
...
qn 2;n 1 = qn 1;n+1
qn 1;n 1 = qn;n+1:
But given the above, the constructed varieties for ^oddn and ^
even
n are (q1;n+1; q2;n+1; : : : ; qn;n+1)
and (q2;n+1; q3;n+1; : : : ; qn+1;n+1). Therefore, the two inequalities in (33) cannot be both
equality unless there exist some optimal o¤ers q1;n+1; : : : ; qn+1;n+1 for the (n + 1)-variety
problem such that
1. q1;n+1; q2;n+1; : : : ; qn;n+1 are some optimal o¤ers for the n-variety problem;
2. q2;n+1; q3;n+1; : : : ; qn+1;n+1 are some optimal o¤ers for the n-variety problem; and
3. q2;n+1; q3;n+1; : : : ; qn 1;n+1 are some optimal o¤ers for the (n  1)-variety problem.
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However, checking our rst-order conditions/di¤erence equations (13) and (14), these are
impossible.
Proof of Theorem 2. From (27),
1 =
Z t
x
max
q0
H (q; x) dG(x) =
Z t
x
H (~q(x); x) dG(x);
where ~q(x)  q1(J 1(x)) for every x 2 [x; t], or equivalently
xv0(~q(x)) = c0(~q(x)):
Given a number of varieties n, any discrete o¤ering can be expressed in terms virtual types
instead of types. Let qi be the quality to serve consumers with virtual types x 2 [xi; xi+1].
Now consider the (suboptimal) discrete o¤ering characterized by
xi =
c0(0)
v0(0)
+
2i  1
2n+ 1

t  c
0(0)
v0(0)

;
qi = ~q

xi + xi+1
2

:
Then the corresponding (suboptimal) n-variety prot is
^n =
nX
i=1
Z xi+1
xi
H(qi; x)dG(x):
Subtracting ^n from 1 and noticing that x = c0(0)=v0(0) < x1 <    < xn < xn+1 = t, we
have
1   ^n =
Z x1
x
H(~q(x); x)dG(x) +
nX
i=1
Z xi+1
xi
[H(~q(x); x) H(qi; x)] dG(x): (34)
The integrand of the rst term of the right-hand side of (34), as a twice continuously
di¤erentiable function of x, can be Taylor expanded around x as
xv(~q(x))  c(~q(x)) + (x  x) v(~q(x)) + 1
2
(x  x)2 v0(~q(x^0))~q0(x^0)
for some x^0 2 [x; x1]. From the fact that ~q(x) = ~q(c0(0)=v0(0)) = 0, it is further simplied
as
1
2

x  c
0(0)
v0(0)
2
v0(~q(x^0))~q0(x^0):
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The integrand of other terms of the right-hand side of (34), as a twice continuously di¤erentiable
function of x, can be Taylor expanded around (xi + xi+1) =2 as
xi + xi+1
2
v(qi)  c(qi)

 

xi + xi+1
2
v(qi)  c(qi)

+

x  xi + xi+1
2

(v(qi)  v(qi)) + 1
2

x  xi + xi+1
2
2
v0(~q(x^i))~q0(x^i)
=
1
2

x  xi + xi+1
2
2
v0(~q(x^i))~q0(x^i)
for some x^i 2 [xi; xi+1]. By denition of ~q(), for any x 2 [x; t],
v0(~q(x)) + xv00(~q(x))~q0(x) = c00(~q(x))~q0(x)
and hence
v0(~q(x))~q0(x) =
(v0(~q(x)))2
c00(~q(x))  xv00(~q(x))
 sup
x2[x;t]
(
(v0(~q(x)))2
c00(~q(x))  xv00(~q(x))
)
= sup
t2[t;t]
(
(v0(q1(t)))
2
c00(q1(t))  J(t)v00(q1(t))
)
:
Since J(t) = c0(q1(t))=v0(q1(t)),
v0(~q(x))~q0(x)  sup
t2[t;t]
(
(v0(q1(t)))
3
v0(q1(t))c00(q1(t))  c0(q1(t))v00(q1(t))
)
= sup
q2[0;q(t)]
(
(v0(q))3
v0(q)c00(q)  c0(q)v00(q)
)
M1:
Notice that M1 < 1 because it is the supremum of a continuous function over a compact
set.
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Now, the rst term of the right-hand side of (34) isZ x1
c0(0)=v0(0)
1
2

x  c
0(0)
v0(0)
2
v0(~q(x^0))~q0(x^0)dG(x)

Z x1
c0(0)=v0(0)
1
2

x  c
0(0)
v0(0)
2
M1dG(x) (35)
<
Z x1
c0(0)=v0(0)
1
2

x1   c
0(0)
v0(0)
2
M1dG(x)
=
M1
2(2n+ 1)2

t  c
0(0)
v0(0)
2
(G (x1) G(x)) :
Other terms of the right-hand side of (34) areZ xi+1
xi
1
2

x  xi + xi+1
2
2
v0(~q(x^i))~q0(x^i)dG(x)

Z xi+1
xi
1
2

x  xi + xi+1
2
2
M1dG(x) (36)
<
Z xi+1
xi
1
2
max
(
xi   xi + xi+1
2
2
;

xi+1   xi + xi+1
2
2)
M1dG(x)
=
M1
2(2n+ 1)2

t  c
0(0)
v0(0)
2
(G (xi+1) G(xi)) :
Therefore,
1   n  1   ^n
<
M1
2(2n+ 1)2

t  c
0(0)
v0(0)
2 
G (x1) G(x) +
nX
i=1
(G (xi+1) G(xi))
!
=
M1
2(2n+ 1)2

t  c
0(0)
v0(0)
2
(G (t) G(x))
=
M1
2(2n+ 1)2

t  c
0(0)
v0(0)
2
(1  F (t)) :
It proves (30) with
M0  M1
8


t  c
0(0)
v0(0)
2
(1  F (t)) :
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Moreover, if G() admits a density g() over the support [x; t] that is bounded from above
by g, then line (35) is at most
1
2
M1g
Z x1
c0(0)=v0(0)

x  c
0(0)
v0(0)
2
dx =
1
6
M1g

x1   c
0(0)
v0(0)
3
=
M1g
6 (2n+ 1)3

t  c
0(0)
v0(0)
3
;
and line (36) is at most
1
2
M1g
Z xi+1
xi

x  xi + xi+1
2
2
dx =
1
6
M1g
"
xi+1   xi
2
3
 

xi   xi+1
2
3#
=
2M1g
6 (2n+ 1)3

t  c
0(0)
v0(0)
3
:
Therefore,
1   n  1   ^n
 (2n+ 1)M1g
6 (2n+ 1)3

t  c
0(0)
v0(0)
3
=
M1g
6 (2n+ 1)2

t  c
0(0)
v0(0)
3
:
Proof of Lemma 1. The maximized values 1, ^1 and ^2 can be solved as
1 =
1
2A2
Z t
t
(J(t)A0   A1)2 dF (t) = 1
2A2
Z t
x
(xA0   A1)2 dG(x);
^1 =
1
2A2
hR t
x (xA0   A1) dG(x)
i2
1 G(x) ;
^2 =
1
2A2
max
x^2[x;t]
8><>:
hR x^
x (xA0   A1) dG(x)
i2
G(x^) G(x) +
hR t
x^
(xA0   A1) dG(x)
i2
1 G(x^)
9>=>; :
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For any x^ 2 [x; t],
2A21 =
Z x^
x
(xA0   A1)2 dG(x) +
Z t
x^
(xA0   A1)2 dG(x)
= (x^A0   A1)2 (G(x^) G(x))  2A0
Z x^
x
G(x) G(x)
g(x)
(xA0   A1) dG(x)
+ (x^A0   A1)2 (1 G(x^)) + 2A0
Z t
x^
1 G(x)
g(x)
(xA0   A1) dG(x)
= (x^A0   A1)2 (1 G(x))
 2A0 (G(x^) G(x))
Z x^
x
G(x) G(x)
g(x)
(xA0   A1) dG(x)
G(x^) G(x)
+2A0 (1 G(x^))
Z t
x^
1 G(x)
g(x)
(xA0   A1) dG(x)
1 G(x^) : (37)
Since both (G(x) G(x))=g(x) and xA0 A1 are nondecreasing in x, they have nonnegative
covariance when x is randomly drawn from [x; x^]. Thus, the integral in the second line of
(37) is at leastZ x^
x
G(x) G(x)
g(x)
dG(x)
G(x^) G(x) 
Z x^
x
(xA0   A1) dG(x)
G(x^) G(x) :
Since (1   G(x))=g(x) is nonincreasing and xA0   A1 is nondecreasing in x, they have
nonpositive covariance when x is randomly drawn from [x^; t]. Thus, the integral in the third
line of (37) is at mostZ t
x^
1 G(x)
g(x)
dG(x)
1 G(x^) 
Z t
x^
(xA0   A1) dG(x)
1 G(x^) :
Therefore,
2A21  (x^A0   A1)2 (1 G(x))
  2A0
G(x^) G(x)
Z x^
x
G(x) G(x)
g(x)
dG(x) 
Z x^
x
(xA0   A1) dG(x)
+
2A0
1 G(x^)
Z t
x^
1 G(x)
g(x)
dG(x) 
Z t
x^
(xA0   A1) dG(x): (38)
The rst integral in the second line of (38) can be written as
x^ (G(x^) G(x)) 
Z x^
x
xdG(x);
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and the rst integral in the third line of (38) can be written as
 x^ (1 G(x^)) +
Z t
x^
xdG(x):
Therefore,
2A21  (x^A0   A1)2 (1 G(x))
 2A0
 
x^ 
R x^
x xdG(x)
G(x^) G(x)
!

Z x^
x
(xA0   A1) dG(x)
 2A0
 
x^ 
R t
x^
xdG(x)
1 G(x^)
!

Z t
x^
(xA0   A1) dG(x): (39)
The second line of (39) can be written as
 2 (x^A0   A1)
Z x^
x
(xA0   A1) dG(x) +
2
hR x^
x (xA0   A1) dG(x)
i2
G(x^) G(x)
and the third line of (39) can be written as
 2 (x^A0   A1)
Z t
x^
(xA0   A1) dG(x) +
2
hR t
x^
(xA0   A1) dG(x)
i2
1 G(x^) ;
and hR x^
x (xA0   A1) dG(x)
i2
G(x^) G(x) +
hR t
x^
(xA0   A1) dG(x)
i2
1 G(x^)  2A2^2:
Therefore,
2A21  (x^A0   A1)2 (1 G(x))  2 (x^A0   A1)
Z t
x
(xA0   A1) dG(x) + 4A2^2:
Since the above holds for any x^ 2 [x; t], let us from now on take the unique x^ that solves
x^A0   A1 =
R t
x (xA0   A1) dG(x)
1 G(x) :
Then,
2A21   
hR t
x (xA0   A1) dG(x)
i2
1 G(x) + 4A2^2 =  2A2^1 + 4A2^2:
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